Constitutional Law—A New Definition of Obscenity by Remson, Jerome D.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 11 Number 1 Article 32 
10-1-1961 
Constitutional Law—A New Definition of Obscenity 
Jerome D. Remson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jerome D. Remson, Constitutional Law—A New Definition of Obscenity, 11 Buff. L. Rev. 104 (1961). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol11/iss1/32 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
"establishment" clause of the First Amendment. 12 However, the Court decided
that the prayer is non-sectarian. To reach this conclusion, the Court had to
determine which are the "recognized" religions, and that the common denomi-
nator of these religions is belief in God. The Court is over-stepping its author-
ity when it delves into the intricacies of religious beliefs. Furthermore, the
Court's decision is of necessity limited to the wording of this particular twenty-
two word prayer. If the wording of the prayer should be changed, or a different
prayer used, the courts might again be asked to determine whether this new
prayer is sectarian. Thus, the court, an arm of the state, becomes the final
arbiter in matters of religious orthodoxy. Such a situation is contrary to the
provisions of the First Amendment which renders each person's religious opinion
as valid and weighty as that of any other person or institution.
The fact that the tenets of most of the religions existing in the United
States include belief in a Supreme Being does not justify this decision. Al-
though the majority generally prevails over the minority in a democracy, this
principal does not apply in the area of religion. The "establishment" clause
of the First Amendment sought to prevent majority rule over the minority in
religious matters by insuring governmental neutrality toward religion. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "neither [a state nor the Federal
Government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions. .... ,,. a
The Supreme Court has also said that "neither [a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment] can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs."'1 4 The Constitution guar-
antees freedom of religion; not just freedom of religion if you believe in God.
The effect of the Court's decision is to sanction the establishment in the public
schools of those religions that believe in a Supreme Being.
The danger of this decision lies in the direction in which it leads. Judge
Dye expressed it as "the gradual erosion of the mighty bulwark erected by
the First Amendment."
P. A. L.
A NEw DEFINITION OF OBSCENITY
The United States Constitution, in the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.15 That which is obscene is not
entitled to these constitutional protections." Thus, the federal' 7 and state
12. Supra note 8.
13. Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 8 at 15.
14. Torcaso v. Watkins, supra note 10 at 495.
15. Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957). The
freedoms of speech and the press expressed in the First Amendment are included in the
liberties protected from state action by the "Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
16. Id. at 481.
17. Censorship has traditionally been regarded as one of the powers reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment. Federal censorship arises in cases where there is use
of the mails, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1957); or there
in an attempt to import obscene literature, United States v. 42000 Copies International
Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.D. 1955).
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governments 18 in the exercise of their police powers are free to impose criminal
sanctions upon those who distribute materials found to be obscene. The police
power cannot operate without limitations. It cannot operate in such a manner
as to suppress any constitutionally protected activity, 9 and must be reasonably
related to a legitimate end in order to come within the bounds of due process
of law.
20
New York's attempt to suppress obscenity dates back to a statute of !1786
which provided that "nothing in this Act shall .. . authorize any Person or
Persons to... publish any book ... that may be profane, treasonable, defama-
tory, or injurious to Government, Morals or Religion." 21 Through the years
the statute has been revised in order to reflect the needs and values of society.
In its present form, the New York Penal Law prohibits the distribution or
showing of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic, masochistic
or disgusting book .. .picture .... ,22 This year, the Court of Appeals in
People v. Richmond County News, 23 held that this provision could be constitu-
tionally used to censor only what it classified as "hard-core" pornography.
The basic problem is that of determining exactly what is obscene under
such statutes. The statutes tend to be general and vague, so that the determi-
nation of a standard for obscenity has been left largely to judicial interpreta-
tion.2 4 The era prior to the Civil War was marked by an almost complete
absence of litigation in this field. It was during the reform period following the
war that litigation first appeared in any quantity,25 and it has since increased
steadily with a large number of important cases having been decided in the
last few years26 and others currently on the court calendars. 27 The earlier cases
dealing with obscenity adhered faithfully to Victorian concepts of morality.
28
They firmly established, as the standard for obscenity, the rule of Regina v.
Hicklin09 which provided that books could be censored as obscene if they had
a tendency to deprave or corrupt those, whose minds are open to immoral influ-
18. Kingsly Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 437 (1957).
19. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
20. Fiener v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951).
21. An Act To Promote Literature, Act of April 29, 1786, ch. LIV § IV, 1 Laws of N.Y.
(Jones and Varrick).
22. N.Y. Penal Law § 1141.
23. 9 N.Y.2d 578, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
24. Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 Law and Const. Prob.
587 (1955).
25. See Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446. (1896); People v. Muller, 96
N.Y. 408 (1884).
26. Lockhart and McClure supra note 24 at 580; see Roth v. United States, supra
note 15, Kingsly Books v. Brown, supra note 18; Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957);
Kingsly International Pictures v. N.Y. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
27. See Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 60 (1960), where there is a discussion of important cases now
pending before the Supreme Court.
28. People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884). The Court of Appeals upheld censorship of
photographs of paintings which had been publicly displayed in art galleries in Paris and
Philadelphia.
29. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), adopted in New York in People v. Muller, supra note 28.
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ences, who may come in contact with them. This test completely ignored the
literary, artistic or social value of the work being censored. As the test was
applied, selected passages or parts of a book could be judged out of context,
and if they were found to be obscene the entire book was subject to censor-
ship.30 Despite this drawback the rule became so well ingrained in American
law,31 that Judge Learned Hand, in one of his most famous opinions, felt con-
strained to follow it, while criticizing it as the product of mid-Victorian morality
having the effect of reducing our literary and artistic treatment of sex to the
standards of a child's library.32 The Hicklin rule remained in full force until
rejected by the Second Circuit in United States v. One Book Ulysses.83 The
Ulysses decision altered the rule significantly so that no longer could the courts
consider portions of a book out of context, but rather they must judge the
dominant effect of the book as a whole. If the dominant theme of a book is
obscene, it cannot be a vehicle for the expression of a constitutionally protected
idea, and so it is properly subject to censorship. The decision, however, did not
alter the basic definition of obscenity as set forth in Hicklin. Hicklin has
some influence today as the courts still try to determine obscenity on the basis
of the effect of a work on its reader's morals.
34
In determining the effect of a work on its reader's morals, the standard to
be applied is its effect on the average adult rather than its effect on a particular
segment of the community. In Butler v. Michigan,35 the Court held that it was
improper to censor literature available to adult readers using the standards of
juvenile morality. Thus, a statute which had as its standard the tendency of
the material to deprave or corrupt children was held unconstitutional because
it was "not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal." 36
The requirement of the standard of the average adult member of the com-
munity was important in subsequent litigation where publications designed spe-
cifically for nudists 37 and homosexuals3 8 were censored. In these cases it was
argued that the publications would not be considered obscene by the respective
groups. The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that the publications
were available to the general public, and the community as a whole cannot be
governed by the standards of a small segment of the population.
Among the most important censorship cases are Roth v. United States and
Alberts v. California, decided together by the Supreme Court in 1957.39 The
30. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 24 at 589-590.
31. See United States v. Clark, 38 F. 500 (E.D. Mo. 1889); United States v. Harmen,
45 F. 414 (D. Kan. 1891); United States v. Smith, 45 F. 476 (E.D. Wis. 1891).
32. United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 120-121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
33. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
34. Supra note 15 at 489; One Inc. v. Olson, 241 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd,
355 U.S. 371 (1958).
35. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
36. Id. at 383.
37. United States v. 42000 Copies International Journal, supra note 17; Sunshine Book
Co. v. Summerfield, supra note 17.
38. One Inc. v. Olson, supra note 34.
39. Supra note 15.
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Court after finding the materials involved to be obscene, in significant dicta
which provides a foundation for subsequent litigation on this point, discussed
the need to protect the freedom of expression. The Court felt that protection
should be extended to any idea of the slightest redeeming social value unless
that expression, by being obscene or inflammatory in nature, would violate a
more important interest. Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Sex is a
matter of public concern about which people should be allowed to express their
ideas free from censorship. Obscene materials were defined as those which deal
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests.4 The test as stated in
Roth is, that if in comparing the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole to the contemporary standards of morality of the average member of the
community, the court finds the material to be such as to appeal to prurient
interests, then the material is obscene.
41
The Supreme Court broadened the application of the prevailing rule when
it refused to censor the movie Lady Chatterley's Lover.4 The Court granted
the movie protection on the ground that it was the legitimate expression of an
idea, i.e., that under the proper circumstances adultery might not only be a
proper, but even a favorable mode of behavior. Thus the decision established
as the standard, that which is not the expression of an idea, but rather is
designed to appeal only to prurient interests thus being devoid of a redeeming
social value. In People v. Richmond County News, the New York Court of
Appeals, in refusing to censor a popular magazine, went beyond the dictates of
the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals held that it would be unconstitutional
to censor anything short of "hard-core" pornography, even if the material was
completely devoid of any artistic or scientific justification, or of any possible
value to society. The Court defined "hard-core" pornography as that which goes
beyond being ribald or bawdy. "Depicting dirt for dirt's sake, the obscence is
vile.... It smacks. . . of sexual perversion and sickness and represents ... a
debauchery of the sexual faculty." 43  This test, "hard-core" pornography,
represents the conclusions of two concurring opinions based largely on the dicta
in Roth expressing the need for a stringent test in order to insure the freedom
to disseminate ideas. In one of the opinions, Judge Fuld argued that Roth is
not binding on New York, so that the courts could adopt a more liberal
standard. "Hard-core" pornography is the only test which he felt would open
the door barring state intrusion "only the slighest crack necessary," 44 and
embody the most universal moral standards. Furthermore, while most previous
tests set out by the courts have been vague, it is argued that the "hard-core"
pornography test can be objectively applied.4 5 Judge Desmond, concurring,
40. Id. at 487.
41. Ibid.
42. Kingsly International Pictures v. N.Y. Board of Regents, supra note 26.
43. Supra note 23 at 587, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
44. Supra note 15 at 488.
45. Query: Is it easier to either define or apply the standard of "hard-core" pornog-
raphy than any of the earlier tests, i.e., "matter appealing to prurient interests?"
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endorsed the standard of "hard-core" pornography as being within the Roth
test, and concluded that the material in question was in no sense filthy or
disgusting or so offensive as to be censored under contemporary standards of
morality.
It would not be unreasonable to assume that under the Roth test the
magazine was found to be obscene 46 and that the Court may have been forced
to announce the "hard-core" pornography standard in order to grant it
protection. The obvious purpose of Section 1141 of the Penal Law is to censor
obscene material. If we assume that the legislature intended the statute to be
enforced to its fullest constitutional extent, the decision, in order to be in
accordance with this intent, should have been rendered within the bounds of
contemporary constitutional interpretation. Nowhere in the history of litigation
has "hard-core" pornography been previously adopted as the standard for
determining what is obscene. As Judge Froessel, in a strong dissenting opinion,
points out, neither Roth nor the First Amendment as now interpreted requires
such a stringent test, the effect of which is tantamount to the repeal of Section
1141. Quoting Judge Cardozo, Judge Froessel noted that;
"All we can say is that the line will be higher than the lowest level
of moral principle and practice and lower than the highest." Yet the
determination is promptly made that the statute should apply only to
the lowest level, namely, "hard-core" pornography, despite Judge
Cardozo's further statement. "It (the law) will follow, or strive to
follow, the principle and practice of the men and women of the
community whom the social mind would rank as intelligent and
virtuous."
4 7
In spite of the strong criticism above, the majority decision is well-grounded
in social theory, and at least one leading authority concurs that the "hard-core"
pornography standard is the logical extension of the current rule, and may well
be the next standard to be adopted by the Supreme Court.48 Until the present
decision, the courts have not relied upon an independent standard, but rather
have tried to define obscenity in the light of the effect of material on its
readers' morals.49 This test has been criticized as being unrealistic 0  How
can the courts accurately determine the effect of a work on one's sexual impulses,
morals, and desires? They cannot! The courts have no scientific instruments
or rules with which to measure the libidinous effect of a book. There is a
46. 3 Judges at Special Sessions City of N.Y., 13 Misc. 2d 1068, 179 N.Y.S.2d 76
(1958); 3 Appellate Judges, 11 A.D.2d 799, 205 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1960); and 3 Court
of Appeals Judges found the magazine to be obscene under the Roth-Alberts test.
Also in Alberts v. California, supra note 1, the Supreme Court upheld a statute,
censoring that which is "obscene and indecent," West's Cal. Penal Code Ann. 1955 § 311,
which appears to be narrower in scope but analogous to the New York statute, supra note 22.
47. Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Sciences 37, cited, 9 N.Y.2d at 592, 216 N.Y.S.2d at
380 (1961).
48. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 27.
49. Supra note 15 at 489; One Inc. v. Olson, supra note 34.
50. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 24 at 590-596.
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shortage of scientific and sociological literature which can enable the courts
to adequately treat this problem. What literature does exist, is mostly devoted
to criticizing the rule. Scientific studies have suggested that literature is not a
primary source of sexual stimulation. They also tend to prove that those people
who are most prone to be stimulated by these books, are also those who are
least likely to read them.5
Freedom of expression is one of our most cherished freedoms and the
courts must be very careful not to allow infringement on this freedom in the
name of suppression of obscenity. In the past several years, there have been
attempts to censor books which are chiefly concerned with sex, i.e., Henry
Miller's Tropic of Cancer,52 James Joyce's Ulysses,5 3 and D. H. Lawrence's
Lady Chatterley's Lover,51 all of which later became best sellers. If the "hard-
core" pornography standard had been applicable in these cases, it seems doubtful
that the propriety of these books would even have been questioned. It is
apparent from their acceptance by the public, that their censorship would not
have been in accord with the desires of the community as a whole. Whenever
the law circumscribes or even threatens to circumscribe an author's freedom to
express himself on a topic, and a large percentage of the community wants to
read what he has to say, there exists a serious threat to our freedom of
expression.
In general it would seem that a large segment of the community is in
favor of less censorship. This has been indicated by the acceptance by the
public of books which have been previously censored, by the liberal trend in
the decisions of the courts, and by the decreasing number of statutes dealing
with special areas of censorship. 55 Censorship is a restriction on our basic
freedom and as such should be as severly limited as possible. The New York
Court of Appeals, by adopting the "hard-core" pornography test, has taken
the lead in this direction with a more liberal application of our censorship
statutes.
I. D. R.
STATUTE PROSCRIBING SALE OF OBSCENE MATERIALS REQUIRES SCIENTER
The New York Penal Law Section 1141 provides that, "A person who
sells.., or has in his possession with intent to sell... any obscene ... book...
is guilty of a misdemeanor." In 1958, after exhaustive analysis, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, concluded in People v. Shapiro that the language
employed in and the history of the statute invoked, as well as the statutes from
51. Ibid.
52. Besig v. United States., 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).
53. Supra note 33.
54. Supra note 18.
55. Entertainment: Public Pressure and the Law, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 326, 328 (1957),
lists New York, Maryland, Virginia and Kansas as the only states which still censor movies.
Excelsior Pictures v. Board of Regents, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957), points out
that the Supreme Court has effectively destroyed most of the grounds upon which New
York can censor movies.
